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ABSTRACT
The Virtual Power System Testbed (VPST) at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign is part of the Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the
Power Grid (TCIP) and is maintained by members of the Information Trust
Institute (ITI). VPST is designed to be integrated with other testbeds across
the country to explore performance and security of Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) protocols and equipment. First, we discuss the
approach we took to developing virtual SCADA models, validating the mod-
els, and how researchers can use the local test bed to validate their own tech-
nologies. Then, we discuss potential use cases in order to motivate the inte-
gration of VPST with other testbeds, identify requirements of inter-connected
testbeds, and describe our design for integration with VPST.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
• DNP3.0 - A protocol used to gather data and issue control commands
between master and slave devices. Also goes by DNP v3.0, DNP3, or
just DNP.
• Power grid - The collection of buses, generators, lines, transformers,
etc. that comprises the system of power delivery from power stations
to power consumers.
• Substation - Also known as an outstation, the substation is an un-
manned location in charge of controlling and collecting data from in-
telligent electronic devices (IEDs) in the immediate area.
• Data Aggregator - A SCADA device at the substation level, which exists
to compile data from the RTUs and report the data to the control
station.
• RINSE - Real-time Immersive Network Simulation Environment.
• MODBUS - An older protocol that operates point-to-point, generally
over a serial connection such as RS-232.
• RTU - Remote Terminal Units are devices in the substation that are
responsible for responding to requests from the control station.
• SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition: A generic term
for industrial control systems.
• Control Station - Central locations used to coordinate control decisions
for regions of the power grid.
• TCP/IP - The Transmission Control Protocol and the Internet Proto-
col. Commonly used protocol combination in the Internet to address
packets to processes and route segments to hosts, respectively.
vii
• CRC - Cyclic Redundancy Check. The CRC is used to detect bit errors
that occur during communication.
• Relay - A digital device that measures circuit status and can open/close
a physical breaker.
• PowerWorld - A steady-state power simulator.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The power grid is an important piece of the infrastructure that allows our
nation to conduct business, communicate, and generally enjoy most modern
comforts. Essentially, without the power being delivered in a reliable and safe
manner, nothing would work. We are also currently going through a rather
major upgrade, termed the “smart grid.” While the existing architecture is
by no means “dumb,” it is a heterogeneous mixture of old machines, new
machines, old protocols, new protocols, and vastly different networks across
domains. As such, it presents a large problem to those who wish to introduce
new innovations and standardize the grid. Part of this problem can be solved
piece by piece, but in order to get a good picture of how technologies interact
in the grid, test beds will play a crucial role. The Virtual Power System Test
Bed aims to provide a national resource, whereby new technologies can be
tested in a realistic environment, and clear feedback can be given about their
efficacies.
As part of the NSF/DOE/DHS supported TCIP project [1], VPST com-
bines large-scale simulation/emulation of networks of SCADA power devices
with real power system hardware and software, and a commercial electric
flow generation and distribution simulator. VPST is unique in its integra-
tion of virtual and physical equipment, as discussed in [2]. It is also unique
in that it supports SCADA-specific virtual traffic. VPST’s principal role so
far has been to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating the components it
has, demonstrate the feasibility of a number of cyber-attacks, and study the
performance and effectiveness of certain other TCIP developed technologies.
It is not yet to the level of general purpose utility achieved by, say, DETER,
although we are working to bring it to that state.
Large portions of this chapter, Chapter 2, and Chapter 13 as well as the majority
of Chapters 9 through 12, and the figures therein, are from a previous work [3] done by
myself and others. The other authors have agreed to its inclusion here.
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Work on VPST has thus been focused on two aspects. First, work has
been done on the local simulation engines to support a SCADA-specific en-
vironment. Our local network communications simulator, RINSE, has been
useful for many years in analyizing malicious traffic patterns on the Internet.
The scalability that it offers presents a good fit for modeling the SCADA
network – one of the few systems that rival the modern Internet in size and
complexity. Building on the RINSE framework, we have designed virtual
models of hosts and protocols which represent their physical analogues. The
two models developed so far provide an important subset of the SCADA
environment’s functionality. Namely, we have implemented virtual models
for relays and data aggregators. These two models serve as the basis for
modeling substations within the control network and can serve as archetypes
for implementing new SCADA models. We have also developed a module to
interface with the electrical simulator which runs concurrently. This module
periodically polls the electrical simulator to retrieve information pertinent to
the operation of the virtual relays. The collection of these virtual mdoels
allows an environment in which new technologies can be evaluated prior to
deployment. Thus, this work allows one to scale a virtual SCADA network
beyond what could be accomplished if one were restricted to using purely
physical devices. Therefore, research groups requiring a scalable SCADA
model to test their ideas now have a platform to do that. In order to ease
the use of our framework, automating information extraction from the elec-
trical simulator to provide an analagous reprensentation for both RINSE and
the Electricity Management Software (EMS) has been a priority as well.
Concurrent with the work on the local test bed and beyond the original
work on VPST [2], we have redesigned the VPST architecture to support
integration with other testbeds, and have already demonstrated basic inte-
grative functionality. We aim towards enabling one to leverage resources
from external collaborators and accomplish tasks that may not have been
feasible without them. For example, one lab may have expertise in cyber
warfare and another may emphasize actual SCADA devices. VPST provides
detailed models of SCADA-specific protocols, enabling studies where an at-
tack is mounted on a large-scale SCADA network. Such integration has a
unique set of requirements, and we have extended VPST with these in mind.
The beginning of this thesis focuses on describing the SCADA simulation
portion of VPST. First, we will discuss the motivation for our system in
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Chapter 2. Then, we give background on the network communications simu-
lator, RINSE, that provides the basis for our SCADA models in Chapter 3 as
well as the unique characteristics of the power grid. Next, in Chapter 4, we
describe DNP3, one of the primary protocols used in SCADA, as well as at-
tacks against DNP3 and the approach used to model it. From there, Chapter
5 discusses virtual hosts and the control flows for each of the SCADA-specific
virtual hosts. Chapter 6 details the local lab enivronment and what each por-
tion is capable of providing. Chapter 7 describes the steps we have taken to
develop and validate our efforts to create the virtual testbed. Next, Chapter
8 describes a potential workflow for testing a new technology in the local test
bed.
After describing the local test bed, the thesis will discuss VPST in terms of
how it interacts with remote test beds. This portion will view VPST and its
components through the lens of three potential use case scenarios, providing
some concreteness behind VPST design decisions. Chapter 9 begins the
discussion of the extension to VPST, starting with three use cases. Next,
we discuss testbed requirements in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 gives a brief
overview of VPST and then delves into the details of our extension. Chapter
12 discusses related projects and how they may use VPST as a national
resource. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 13 while detailing some of our
ongoing work.
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CHAPTER 2
MOTIVATION
There is an emerging awareness of the need for security in SCADA systems,
and the Department of Energy (DOE) is giving considerable attention to
securing the power grid. The power grid is a critical infrastructure (CI) due
to our country’s reliance on electricity. Simply put, there would be chaos
without a reliable energy delivery system. We have seen what happens when
power is cut to large areas [4, 5, 6], and it would be disasterous for it to
happen on an even larger scale. Blackouts have occured for a variety of rea-
sons, be they mechanical failures, control failures, network failure, operator
failure, or a combination. There are also realistic attack vectors – both cy-
ber [7, 8, 9] and physical [10] – that, while have yet to be exploited, must
be better understood. Investigation of all of these failure modes will result
in remediation techniques that can provide protection. Both independent
researchers and government officials have formed workgroups and task forces
[11, 12] to investigate and offer their advice [13], but these suggestions need
to be tested and refined before they can be implemented.
However, working directly with the power grid to conduct these investiga-
tions is a poor decision for multiple reasons. For the very same reason that
the power grid must be made secure – that it is critical to the operation of our
country – modifications to the grid must not be done until adequate testing
has taken place. As such, an important approach to studying cyber-security
of the power grid is through test systems, so as not to interfere with real
systems. These test systems may use actual equipment in order to properly
understand how the equipment will react in various situations. However, the
scope of the power grid makes it infeasible to create a physical test system
anywhere near its full scale. Simulation and emulation help to alleviate this
concern, as it is possible to create large-scale network simulation/emulations
of models as large as regional or even national power grids.
Specifically, certain technologies would stand to gain a lot from detailed
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simulation. One such area of work is cryptography. Cryptography research
can take different forms in the SCADA environment. It can be used to in-
vestigate the practicality of retrofitting bump-in-the-wire devices between
legacy devices [14], research the practicality of various forms of key man-
agement [15], test the practicality of using puzzles to confirm identity in a
large scale network [16], or examine protocols such as DNP3 with Secure
Authentication [17] or DNPSec [18].
Unique requirements of the power grid motivate the work being done here.
The massive scale of the power grid necessitates the use of a virtual envi-
ronment which can match its scope. Other test beds such as DETER [19]
will not scale well enough due their dependence on real hardware. OPNET-
based simulators will not scale, because, unlike RINSE, they do not support
multi-resolution simulation – a technique that allows high scalable frame-
works. Certainly, these test beds provide essential services and are not to be
discounted. However, they do present a gap that we hope to fill with VPST.
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CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND
This work positions itself at the intersection of two other interesting top-
ics of research. One of these areas is network simulation. The other is the
power grid. Network simulation demands attention to details such as fidelity,
performance, and scaling, while the power grid requires insight into the in-
teraction between control and electrical planes as well as the development of
new technologies to address SCADA-specific challenges.
3.1 RINSE
Based on the Scalable Simulation Framework (SSF) [20], RINSE is a network
simulator that serves as the basis for this research and has been through
several iterations. RINSE is currently maintained by a team of developers
working at University of Illinois under the TCIP project. Developers are
working on a variety of projects including wireless communications, switch
modeling, and intrusion prevention through game theory. RINSE has tradi-
tionally been used as a wireline network communications simulator to explore
the behaviors of malicious behavior in the Internet – namely worms, botnets,
and denial of service attacks. The scalability that RINSE allows and the sim-
ilarity of the Internet to the SCADA infrastructure make it a good candidate
for simulating SCADA traffic.
RINSE has a number of properties that make it amenable to large-scale
simulation. SSF enables highly parallelizable models by partitioning graphs
into submodels. These submodels, which compose the main model, are di-
vided such that communication between them is kept to a minimum. Thus,
these partitions can be run in separate processes on separate computers to
harness the power of multi-processor environments. Also, RINSE supports
multiple resolutions. That is, RINSE can calibrate the fidelity of a simulation
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to ensure that it runs in real time. It does this by providing a fluid model
[21] for traffic, and allowing both full-fidelity traffic and fluid models to exist
within the same simulation. These fluid models exist for various components
of RINSE such as transport protocols, routers, and links. These models also
exist for modeling network topologies, and by utilizing these models, RINSE
achieves a significant speedup over using a full resolution model. By using
fluid models for background traffic, we can simulate the effect of such traffic
without actually modeling it exactly. This allows more extensive evaluation
of the models and protocols of importance such as newly designed security
devices.
RINSE also supports simulation speeds that are faster than real time. This
means that the simulator is not dependent on wall-clock time to advance the
simulator time. This is important when interfacing with real devices through
emulation. Instead of synchronizing with the wall-clock, the simulator keeps
track of its own timeline and, where possible, computes traffic ahead of when
it will be needed. Combined with prioritizing emulated packets, RINSE can
provide a large-scale simulation environment that is not slowed down by
interacting with physical devices.
Addtionally, RINSE is modular in such a way that new protocols and new
models can be developed. By implementing new protocols through extending
the base ProtocolMessage, RINSE can support the integration of existing or
nascent protocols. Likewise, the ProtocolSession class allows us to develop
new layers in the protocol stack. In the case of DNP3, for instance, the
relays are derived from the ProtocolSession class and communicate with the
data aggregators through messages derived the ProtocolMessage class. The
ProtocolSessions that comprise a host are indicated in a file by using the
Domain Modeling Language (DML). DML describes a model as a tree of key-
value pairs and a file containing a DML model is passed to the simulation
engine at run time. These key-value pairs are then interpreted and used
to derive the network topology, hosts, protocols, and traffic patterns. This
allows RINSE to simulate any number of models without having to recompile,
thus increasing the turn-around time between testing iterations of the same
model.
At the end of a simulation, RINSE can present detailed statistics regarding
such metrics as bandwidth usage and dropped packets. Alternatively, the
flow of traffic can be analyzed visually through the network visualizer, a
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GUI designed specifically for displaying RINSE simulations. RINSE can also
be instrumented to keep track statistics on device-specific functionality, such
as throughput of an algorithm. Additionally, traffic from RINSE can also be
dumped to a tcpdump and analyzed in more depth by tools such as tcpanaly
[22, 23], a tool developed by Vern Paxson.
3.2 Power Grid
The power grid is an incredibly large, incredibly complicated network that
combines both physical and cyber devices. The power grid consists of three
main parts: generation, transmission, and distribution. The generation oc-
curs at power plants and can come from a variety of sources, such as nuclear,
coal, wind, etc. The transmission lines are the high voltage lines that run
across the country transporting elecrical energy from the generation facilities
to the areas of consumption. Distribution occurs at a local level, serving
as a step-down from the high-voltage transmission lines to the lower-voltage
energy fit for consumers. All three of these domains have their own issues,
security and otherwise. For instance, security at the generation sites involves
armed guards, hardened firewalls, and the like. Their larger concern is safety
though, as a large plant operating outside normal operating parameters poses
a large risk to personel and machinery. In the distribution regime, a large
concern regarding the new smart grid is that of securing private data against
disclosure. The transmission section of the grid is smaller in scale than the
distribution side, but it has its own unique concerns. Much of the control
systems that regulate the transmission lines are now highly interconnected,
both to themselves and to the internet. This is an issue that must be ad-
dressed and this research has been a step forward in evaluating potential
solutions to potential problems.
Traditionally, the grid has used MODBUS over serial connections to com-
municate between devices. More recently, protocols such as DNP3 in the US
and IEC 60870-5 in Europe have been used to communicate over the long
distances between substations and control stations. These protocols are also
used to communicate between substations and the RTUs in the field. In the
substation itself, the trend is currently to use IEC 61850 to communicate.
These current and future trends are discussed elsewhere [24].
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CHAPTER 4
SIMULATING DNP3
When simulating a new protocol or device, there always exists the question
of how accurately we must model the proposed design. However, there ex-
ists little question that we must model the design itself, and not force an
incongruent model onto it. The option of tweaking parameters of a differ-
ent model to estimate the new model rarely works because there are often
fundamental features that do not lend themselves to be portrayed by a dif-
ferent model. For instance, we could hypothetically model the power grid as
a purely TCP/IP oriented network, with parameters such as poll interval,
packet size, latency, bandwidth, etc., set to portray the parameters present
in the power grid. However, this would completely ignore the idiosyncracies
of the grid itself. For instance, if there is a vulnerability in the protocol
specification or implementation, it would be agnostic to the network layout
and configuration. In this manner, we can say that if we care at all about
the quirks and security assumptions of a protocol, then we must model that
protocol as accurately as the scale of the network permits.
4.1 DNP3 Overview
DNP v3.0 [25] is a communications protocol that is used to communicate
among power grid equipment. Designed to provide interoperability and an
open standard to device manufacturers, DNP3 has gained prominence in the
United States electrical grid. Versions 1.0 and 2.0 were never released to the
public; hence, DNP v3.0 is often referred to just DNP. So as to not confuse
this protocol with previous implementations, this paper will refer to it as
DNP3. DNP3 is designed to operate in environments with a high electronics
density. These environments can be fairly noisy, and therefore, DNP3 is
designed to be as robust as possible in regards to detecting and recovering
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from error. Extensive use of CRC bytes are used to detect when bits have
been flipped and a small frame size (292 bytes) is used to localize errors and
reduce the overhead imposing by resending frames.
The protocol was designed as a stack of three layers: the data link layer,
the pseudo-transport function and the application layer. The general hi-
erarchy can be seen in Figure 4.1. The physical medium is generally ei-
ther Ethernet or RS-485. Since these standards are common, DNP3 can
be run over existing networks or networks can be built from the ground
up to support DNP3 SCADA networks. Proving framing information and
reliability is the Data Link Layer which can either be run directly on the
physical medium as in Figure 4.1 or it can be encapsulated by other pro-
tocols as seen in Figure 4.2. On top of the Data Link Layer is the Pseudo-
Transport Layer. This simple layer is used to support fragmentation. Finally,
the top layer is the Application Layer which acts on behalf of the user for
requesting/confirming/sending/receiving requests and data.
4.1.1 Data Link Layer
As with any data link layer, the DNP3 Data Link Layer is responsible for
point to point communication. Essentially, what is contained in this layer
is addressing. More specifically, the individual fields for this layer can be
seen in the top portion of Figure 4.3. All DNP3 messages start with two
bytes 0x05 0x64 to indicate the beginning of a frame. Next is one byte for
the length of the packet. This length is the number of bytes in the message
disregarding the CRC bytes.
Following the length is the control code. In the blown-up box of the top
portion of Figure 4.3, we see the breakdown of this byte into bit fields:
• DIR (Direction): Indicates the direction of data travel.
• PRI (Primay): A 1 indicates that the frame is sent by the intiating
party, where a 0 indicates the frame is sent by the responding party.
This is distinct from DIR in the case of report-by-exception.
• FCB (Frame Count Bit): Indicates whether the frame is an even or
odd frame.
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• FCV (Frame Count Valid): Indicates if the frame counting is enabled.
• Functions 3-0 : Provides information about the frame. If the frame is
from the initiating party this can indicate either a send or a request.
A responding party will use these bits to indicate either a confirm or a
response.
Following the Control byte are two bytes that give the destination address
of the frame (DST ). Two bytes also idicate the source of the frame (SRC ).
The Data Link header concludes with 2 bytes of CRC that are computed
against the first 8 bytes. Further information can be found in the DNP3
specification for the data link layer, volume 4 [26].
4.1.2 Psuedo-Transport Layer
This layer is responsible for the seggmentation of the Application Layer into
lower level frames. It is a rather simple layer that consists of only one byte.
As seen in the middle box in Figure 4.3, this byte is separated into 3 fields.
The most significant bit, FIN , indicates whether this frame is the last in a
sequence of frames that correspond to one application layer fragment. The
second bit, FIR, indicates whether this frame is the first in a sequence of
frames that correspond to one Application Layer fragment. For a message
that can fit into one frame, both of these bits would be set.
The lower 6 bits act as the sequence number, which serves to detect
dropped frames, out-of-order frames, and other such errors. Once the counter
reaches 0x3F , it simply resets to 0. Further information can be found in the
DNP3 specification for the transport function, volume 3 [27].
4.1.3 Application Layer
The bottom box of Figure 4.3 shows the Application layer. The Application
Layer is comprised of two sections – the Application Protocol Control Infor-
mation (APCI) and the Application Service Data Unit (ASDU). First, we
will describe the APCI. The APCI can either be a response header or a re-
quest header depending on the purpose of the packet. Both types of headers
contain Application Control and Function Code fields.
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Like a Transport Control byte, the Application Control byte contains two
bits indicating whether the fragment is the first, final, or both fragment in
a user level message. Unlike the Transport Control byte, the Application
Control byte also contains a bit indicating whether the receiver ought to
respond to the message or not. The lowest 5 bits are then used for a sequence
number.
Following the Control byte is the Function Code byte. This byte indicates
the purpose of the message. The most common function codes are confirm,
read, write, select, operate, response, and unsolicted response. Their exact
meanings will not be discussed, but their functionality is fairly straightfor-
ward. Perhaps the only two that warrant explanation are select and operate,
which act as a two-step process. First, a select command tells the slave
which control point will be changed. Then, the operate command changes
the point, which may control a characteristic such as a threshold value or a
fidelity requirement.
A response header also contains Internal Indications which are spread
across two bytes as sixteen separate bit fields. Their values will not be de-
scribed here, but their general purpose is to indicate device status or provide
an error message.
The application layer contains the function code for either requests or
responses. Following this identification code in a response is any data that
the master may have requested. Information can be found in the DNP3
specification, volume 2 [28].
4.1.4 Cyclic-Redundancy Check
Every 16 bytes are entered into a CRC and the next two bytes contain this
CRC. DNP3 has its own CRC function of the form x16 + x13 + x12 + x11 +
x10 + x8 + x6 + x5 + x2 + 1. A CRC is also performed on the Data Link
layer header and the two bytes are placed directly at the end of this header,
before the Psuedo Transport Layer. It is up to the vendor to decide how they
want their device to compute CRCs. One way of doing so is to use a lookup
table, whereby every byte has a pre-computed output. The other option
is to use an accumulation method whereby each bit is right shifted into an
accumulation register. Implementation details for the CRC can be found in a
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document [29] released by the DNP3 User’s Group. This document contains
code examples for implementing both of these approaches.
4.2 Attacking DNP3
As one of the primary protocols used to transmit information in the power
grid, it is important that we model DNP3 as accurately as possible. One
reason for this is that there exist deficiencies in the protocol that allow it
to be compromised. For instance, one research group [30] has developed a
taxonomy to describe attacks against DNP3. In their paper, they describe
28 generic attacks (of which there are 91 specific instances) which show how
vulnerable the protocol is. Countermeasures for these holes could easily be
tested in a simulation environment before becoming part of the standard.
Another group has compiled a survey of SCADA-related attacks, and dis-
cusses techniques such as attack trees, fault trees, and risk analysis as it
pertains to CIs [31]. Indeed, much research has been done on both SCADA
security gaps [13, 32, 33, 34] and their countermeasures, including data set
security [35], SCADA-specific Itrustion Prevention Systems [36], and encap-
sulating DNP3 in another protocol such as SSL/TLS or IPSec [37]. Clearly,
the power grid is susceptible to attack and while the exact nature of these
vulnerabilities is out of the scope of this paper, this knowledge provides the
impetus to model DNP3 accurately enough to reproduce the vulnerabilities
in our virtual test bed.
4.3 Modeling DNP3
No matter the actual implementation of the protocol in the simulator, the
protocol must be able to handle all three layers of the stack (data link,
transport, and application). Inside the simulator, we treat the three layers
as a combined payload to be transported by TCP/IP. Inside the simulator,
packets are routed using the IP header as opposed to the data-link layer
header. However, when dealing with emulated packets, the data-link source
and destination fields are used to direct packets to and from the proper hosts.
More information about this can be found in Section 5.3, which discusses how
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translation is done between the virtual hosts’ IDs and their emulated DNP3
adresses.
Dealing with emulated packets is an important concern for our use of
this virtual DNP3 model. Being compliant with physical devices enables
many potential use cases. Without external communications, the RINSE
model would provide limited usefulness. It would provide background traffic,
metrics regarding correctness and scaling of technologies, and insight into
large scale SCADA networks. However, by being interoperable with physical
equipment, more use cases are available which involve a control station. This
provides tremendous benefit and some of these use cases are further outlined
in Section 9.1.
4.3.1 Approach
Instead of using a full-fledged implementation of the DNP3 stack, we model
our own slightly abstract view due to a few different reasons. The main reason
for this is scalability. With the potential of modelling hundreds of thousands
of relays, it would be nearly impossible to model the full functionality of
DNP3. Enabling the functionality to respond to the entire set of DNP3
requests would require more computational power than can be afforded per
relay. Instead, by focusing on supporting two classes of reads, with only
a few object types, and one type of command, we can greatly simplify the
control flow to enable quick computation and low-latency replies. However,
if requested by a collaborator, the structure to extend the models to support
extra function codes does exist.
Instead of using the DNP3 stack directly, we treat it as a TCP/IP payload.
Historically, DNP3 has been used on its own for data link and transport func-
tionality. More recently, however, DNP3 has been encapsulated by TCP/IP
so as to take advantage of the routability offered by Ethernet-based technol-
ogy. As such, it is hardly a stretch to model DNP3 as a TCP/IP payload
within RINSE. Likewise, communication between RINSE and the control
station also uses DNP3 on top of TCP/IP.
It is obvious why we must explicitly model the transport and application
layers as they provide the core functionality of DNP3. However, what is less
clear is why we must model the data link layer. Since the IP layer of our
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simulator provides routing, it would seem that we do not necessarily have
to rely on the DNP3 data link layer to route information from one device to
another. Some reasons that we shoose to include this layer are that there
may be unknown interactions between layers. For instance, if an adversary
tampers with a field in the this layer, the application layer may not function
properly. As seen in Section 4.2, there are attacks that directly attack the
data link layer. Without modeling this layer, we would not know whether
defenses properly address the issues. Similarly, there may be vulnerabilities
that exist solely at the data link layer, and without modeling it, we may never
uncover these faults. Lastly, since our simulator has the capability to emulate
nodes (i.e., representing a real host as a stub in the simulation), we must
support communication with real hosts. All the pieces of physical equipment
in our lab require a well-formed packet in order to function properly. If we
fail to deliver that, then our simulation is a failure.
In addition to this, DNP3 is fairly flexible. For instance, it can run on a
multitude of physical layers, and in the real world, RS-458 and Ethernet are
the two most common. We chose to implement DNP3 as a payload to be
encapsulated by TCP/IP. This allowed us to route packets more easily and
communicate with the control server. Another such decision that is left up to
the vendor is how to implement the CRC function. We chose to implement it
as a shift/accumlator, since this method has a constant calcuation time. The
table lookup method, on the other hand, is faster in the best case scenario,
but endures a penalty if the table is ever evicted from the cache. The RINSE
implementation for this function was based on an algorithm released by the
DNP3 User’s Group [29], with some modifications to fit within the RINSE
framework.
4.3.2 Drawbacks
Of course, with many of the design decisions we have made, there are bound
to be some drawbacks. Also, modeling the three layers as one layer can speed
up simulation time, but it also means that DNP3 cannot be used on its own
to provide any of its functionality. Currently, this is not a problem, but if
there is a need to model DNP3 directly on top of the physical link, it would
require a reworking of the DNP3 implementation. Additionally, it would
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require a rewrite to the way RINSE handles routing as it currently routes
based on IP address. In illumnating these drawbacks, it is our hope that we
have further illustrated the tradeoffs of our design decisions. Where possible,
speed and scalability have been optimized over other characteristics.
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4.4 Figures
Figure 4.1: DNP3 Protocol Stack [38]
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Figure 4.2: DNP3 Protocol Stack Encapsulated by TCP/IP
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CHAPTER 5
VIRTUALIZING HOSTS
A host is the term we give to nodes in the simulator that have some sort
of computational power. That is, a host models some real world device.
Traditionally, these hosts have modeled routers, servers, and clients. In this
project, hosts have been extended to model the various computational entities
in a power system. Namely, we have chosen to simulate data aggregators and
relays. On the other hand, we have chosen not to simulate control stations,
due to a few factors including their complex structure, their proprietary na-
ture, and heavy customizability. Instead, we rely on our real control station,
which provides the added benefit of allowing a human to view the simulated
network as part of a real network or as a real network in itself.
5.1 Virtual Data Aggregators
The virtual data aggregators have a control flow similar to that of the virtual
relays. However, since they require data from the relays instead of Power-
World, their polling patterns are somewhat different. Instead of sending out
one data request per window, it sends out n requests per window, where n
is the number of relays reporting to it. It does this in a round-robin fashion,
cycling from relay 0 to relay n− 1.
The control flow for the master thread, seen in Figure 5.2, describes how
the virtual data aggregator polls the relays for which it is responsible. First,
the data aggregator waits t seconds before beginning the round of requests.
Starting with relay 0, the data aggregator prepares a request, and waits
the appropriate amount of time that its physical analogue would take to
produce the request. Then it sends the request and waits for the reply.
Once it receives the response, the data aggregator then begins processing
the command. Processing the command depends on which requests were
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requested and how the response is formatted. In the basic scenario, the data
supplied by the response is simply entered as a corresponding entry into a
table, which can be queried by the control station. Once the response is
processed, the data aggregator moves on to the next relay and starts the
request flow again. Once the data aggregator has polled all of the relays in
its list, it waits until the next polling period and resets the current relay to
0.
The data aggregator also acts as source of data for the control station.
This responsibility is handled by the virtual data aggregator’s slave thread,
as illustrated by Figure 5.3. The slave thread essentially acts as a server,
remaining idle until it receives an incoming request from the control station.
When it receives a request, it begins to process it. The data aggregator then
makes a decision based on the function code in the request. If the function
corresponds to a read, then the data aggregator will provide the requested
data out of its table. If the function is some sort of command, then the data
aggregator passes the command to the correct relay and waits for a response.
Once either the relay responds or the data is ready (depending on which
function code was sent to the data aggregator), then the data aggregator
prepares a response to the control station. Then the data aggregator waits
for an appropriate delay, corresponding to the delay its physical analogue
would take for preparing the packet. Finally, the data aggregator sends the
response and goes back into a waiting state.
5.2 Virtual Relays
Relays are responsible for control of physical lines as well as gathering data
pertaining to their operation. Relays must determine various characteristics
of these lines, such as phase angle, voltage, real and reactive power, and other
such values. Additionally, relays must provide information about their own
operation such as status values, counters, and synchronization efforts. It is
unrealistic to support all of these features in a virtual relay, as that would
severely hamper scalability. In particular, this would introduce extra com-
putation, which would result in unfavorable latency. As such, it is important
to determine which subset of features must be supported in order to provide
the largest functional coverage at the lowest computational cost.
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The functionality that covers a large majority of typical requests is as
follows:
• Read Class X data – X can be 0, 1, 2, or 3. Different values of X
represent different priorities, where 1 refers to data that changes the
most often, and 3 the least. Class 0 data includes all data points. This
covers such data points as status, voltage, power, phase angles, and
many others. Since PowerWorld provides some of these values either
directly or indirectly (through simple mathematical operations), this
sort of data can be provided to the data aggregators at the substation
level.
• Turn breaker on/off – A request sent to the relay to turn on or off can
then be passed on to the state server.
The primary function of the virtual relays as modeled by this project is to
respond to commands issued by the virtual data aggregators. They do not
detect events and issue unsolicited responses, as their physical analogues are
capable of. This difference is described in detail in Section 13.1
The control flow for virtual relays can be seen in Figure 5.1. When not
processing a request, the relays are sitting idle. During this time, they are
waiting for a data aggregator to issue a request. Once received, the relay de-
termines what type of request this is; currently, the relays support a limited
subset of what their physical analogues support. The relay will thus deter-
mine if it can answer the request, and if it is either a data read request or a
command, it will perform the required actions. If the request is a read, then
the relay will retrieve data from the state server through its own designated
shared memory. If the data aggregator request is a command, the relay takes
a corresponding action by writing to shared memory. The state server is then
responsible for forwarding this command to PowerWorld. Once the appro-
priate action is taken, the relay prepares a response. The response contains
either the data or a confirmation, depending on whether the request was a
data request or a command, respectively. Once sent, the relay re-enters the
idle mode, and waits for the next request.
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5.3 State Server
The state server acts as a single point of contact between the RINSE simu-
lation environment and the PowerWorld simulation environment. The same
procedure that generates the DML file also generates a mapping between
PowerWorld entities and the virtual relays that are assigned to monitoring
them. Using this mapping, the state server generates requests according to
the PowerWorld API. The requests are split into four different groups – lines,
generators, loads, and shunts. After PowerWorld processes these commands,
it sends back a response with the appropriate values.
PowerWorld was designed with a server thread which can serve data to ex-
ternal applications. This has been used in the past for a MODBUS converter,
but no previous implementation for DNP3 has been developed. Hence, we
have created this state server, whose control flow can be seen in Figure 5.4.
This figure can best be understood as four similar tasks being carried out
in succession. Polling periods start by preparing a request for shunt values
from PowerWorld. After waiting for a response, it processes the response
and moves on to requesting generator values. The state server then repeats
the process for load and line values. Finally, the state server waits t seconds
before starting the process over again.
Once the data is transferred from PowerWorld to RINSE, it is up to the
state server to partition the data. Depending on which values were requested,
the amount of data a relay will receive can vary (typically, the values available
are real power usage, reactive power usage and status, which are represented
by 5 to 9 bytes). Thus, the state server splits up the response into appropri-
ately sized portions and shares them with the relays through shared memory.
This choice of using shared memory as opposed to explicitly passing a
message with the data was made to better represent the real world. Even
though the state server has no real world counterpart, its sole role is to deliver
data from PowerWorld to the virtual relays. As such, its latency should be no
greater than the time it takes for a relay to measure the line it is connected
to – essentially zero. Transmitting this information over the routing network
would introduce latency into the system that has no real world analogue.
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5.4 Figures
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Figure 5.1: Virtual Relay Control Flow
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CHAPTER 6
LOCAL LAB ENVIRONMENT
With virtual relays, data aggregators, and a protocol, we can now combine
these to produce a usable system. Figure 6.1 shows how this system comes
together. Our laboratory contains equipment donated from generous donors.
Due to their generosity, we have quite a few SCADA devices, software, and
support. The lab contains a variety of electronics: SCADA devices, worksta-
tions, and consumer-side equipment. While some of this may be integrated
in the future, VPST currently utilizes two SEL-421 relays, an SEL-3351
data aggregator, and a workstation running the OSI Monarch OpenView
EMS software suite [39]. The relays are each attached to an SEL-AMS. The
Adaptive Multichannel Source (AMS) is intended to support lab testing of
SEL devices, and provide sinusoidal waveforms which feed into the relays.
Our communications simulator, RINSE, provides the SCADA simulation
for our local lab environment. Its components have been described in Chap-
ters 4 and 5. Using these components, we can generate any topology we
wish. Shown in Figure 6.1 is a simple topology that includes a virtual con-
trol station proxy, multiple substations with one data aggregator and multi-
ple relays per substation, and state server that communicates with a virtual
PowerWorld proxy. The figure shows boxes labeled as substations, which
currently consist only of a data aggregator. As more devices are modeled
and added to the substation domain, this model may or may not change.
The PowerWorld proxy is directed through emulation to a computer running
PowerWorld which runs a steady-state power simulation. PowerWorld has an
API that can interface with external devices using its proprietary protocol.
There is a server package that uses this API to service MODBUS responses
to the EMS as though there were MODBUS relays responding. In this fig-
ure, we do not show PowerWorld interfacing with anything besides RINSE,
although the capability is there, and may certainly be beneficial to certain
use cases.
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In order to provide emulation support, we must also utilize proxies hosted
on physical machines. They are not shown in Figure 6.1 as they would only
serve to clutter the illustration. However, our setup would not work without
them. The purpose of these machines is to redirect traffic from themselves
into RINSE, acting like a trampoline. Since RINSE operates on its own
virtual private network, in order to direct traffic towards one of the virtual
nodes, the traffic must orginate from within that virtual private network. In
order to provide this functionality, RINSE comes equipped with a gateway
that supports OpenVPN connections. From a workstation, we connect us-
ing an OpenVPN client to the OpenVPN server on RINSE’s host machine.
This allows a physical machine to be in the same private address space as
the virtual machines. Once this connection is complete, we can redirect this
proxy machine’s incoming traffic to any destination inside RINSE. We also
can redirect any traffic arrive on the private network address to physical com-
puters. In this manner, the State Server can communicate with PowerWorld
in both directions. By redirecting different ports to different addresses, we
can allow the Control Station to poll any device in RINSE so long as it is set
up to redirect on the proxy machine.
The lab is on a switched network, which provides two useful capabilities.
The first is that we can use WireShark to look at traffic between all of these
hosts. This allows us to troubleshoot communications between of the devices
which is important since the relays only support maintentance through telnet .
For instance, if we notice that the control station is no long updating, we can
pinpoint where the break in communication is. When working with physical
proxy machines, the ability to trace packets throughout the network also
assists in determining if a link has been accidentally disabled. In addition, it
also allows us to inspect the packets themselves. This has proved helpful for
timing requirements as well as modeling both DNP3 and the virtual hosts.
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CHAPTER 7
DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION
When building a system such as this, fidelity is an important concern. That
is, the system must perform in the same manner as the real-world analogue.
There are varying degrees of fidelity, and development of this system has gone
through phases addressing different levels of fidelty. First, the system must
interact with physical equipment in such a way that the physical equipment
does not realize that it is operating inside a partially virtualized environment.
This is termed interopability. Second, the virtual hosts must accurately
reflect such characteristics as response times and accuracy of data. This
can be acheived by tuning the corresponding parameters. Third, verification
must be run on the virtual system itself to ensure that no race conditions
exist in the modeling code. Finally, since SCADA network information is
closely guarded, an expert must be brought in to verify that the virtual
network reflects a real-world network.
7.1 Interoperability
The first goal in creating a virtual host is allowing it to communicate with
an external device. Reaching this goal will take several steps. First, we
create a new virtual host which receives a transmission and responds with a
hardcoded message. This hardcoded message can be devised by examining
traffic between real world devices. For instance, when devising responses for
virtual data aggregators, we look at requests from the real control station to
the real data aggregator and copy the response. With this model, it allows
us to test the communication channel. The communication channel, which
is made up of the virtual networking stack, a virtual proxy, a physical proxy,
a physical routing network, and a physical end-host, can have some snags
that need to be worked out before working with a more dynamic response.
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Once the physical end-host receives and successfully decodes the hardcoded
message, we consider this stage a success.
The next step is to generate responses dynamically. In order to do this,
there are two steps. The first step is to create a virtual analogue of the phys-
ical protocol. In this case, the protocol is DNP3.0 encapsulated by TCP/IP.
Within RINSE, this is represented as a ProtocolMessage with a correspond-
ing ProtocolSession. The ProtocolMessage class contains member data to
correspond to each of the fields specified in Section 4.1. When communi-
cating with a physical host, the class structure must be converted to a byte
stream and there are functions that perform this for both directions. Addi-
tionally, there is a helper function to compute and interpose the CRCs when
converting to a byte stream.
After the protocol was implemented, the next step was to produce the
dynamically generated message with static data. To do this, we extract the
DNP3.0 request, convert it to a DNP3.0 ProtocolMessage, and process it.
The control flow has been discussed in Section 5.1.
Once we ensured that the virtual data aggregator was able to correctly
generate a response with static data, it was time to generate a response with
dynamic data. This is when work on the state server began. In order for
the control station to observe a changing environment, responses from the
data aggregators must reflect a changing environment. Therefore, each of the
relays must also derive its state from a changing environment. Each could
poll PowerWorld independently but this would not scale well. Instead, we
chose to implement a single point of contact – namely the state server. In
this manner, we have eliminated costly overhead by compressing multiple
requests and responses into one.
This design model can serve as a model for integretating different virtual
hosts into this framework. Perhaps it can also aid in developing other frame-
works for both the RINSE platform and others.
7.2 Tuning Parameters
Once we have a generalized virtual model, it can be tuned to represent any
number of physical analogues. By tuning parameters such as polling inter-
val, polling pattern, and response time, we can model various types of data
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aggregator computers. New features could also be added by specifying them
in the DML without designing brand new virtual data aggregators. Virtual
relays do not have any polling interval (the data is already available upon re-
ceiving a request); however, they can be matched to their physical analogues
by changing their response time. Were a virtual MODBUS protocol created,
another parameter in DML could be specified for protocol support. If a new
physical device cannot be modeled by changing some of these parameters,
then it may be a wise idea to investigate either altering the model or creating
a derived class or an entirely new class of device.
As for what we have done in the lab, we have analyzed physical data aggre-
gators and physical relays by observing their polling patterns and response
times. Then, we have tuned the parameters such that these match as closely
as possible. We also check to ensure that the model size does not impact the
response time for a relay. We set relay proccessing time = 2 ms for multiple
model sizes and compare the results, which can be seen in Table 7.1. As the
table shows, response times do not depend on the model size. This is key to
operating in a large-scale simulation; if the response times changed based on
the size of the model, then evaluations of new technologies against scaling
environments could not be compared between model sizes.
7.3 Expert Analysis
Due to the criticality of the power grid, it is difficult to acquire network
topologies. It is also difficult to acquire the designs for SCADA devices from
their vendors. In addition to creating these models based upon observing
the lab devices, some power experts in TCIP have offered their expertise.
Thanks to them, the virtual models in this project have been through multi-
ple iterations. Aspects such as polling patterns and the parameterization of
virtual models appear to be sufficient. Network topologies can be managed
through DML files and do not require RINSE development access, and there-
fore are not at the core of this analysis. The topologies described in previous
sections are simplified, but accurate enough to present a good picture. The
two suggestions that ought to be tackled next are expanded functionality
of the meters and extra virtual models for other devices. This ought to be
done on a case-by-case basis, though, as model devlopment should be guided
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toward a specific goal and not just for the sake of having extra models. The
most important thing, though, is that the models contain enough parameters
to allow an experimenter to model a device without delving into the RINSE
source code.
7.4 Table
Table 7.1: Average Response Time For Varying Model Sizes
Size of Model (# relays) Average Response Time of Read Requests (ms)
10 2.02820
50 2.02818
100 2.02822
200 2.02817
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CHAPTER 8
SAMPLE WORKFLOW
In this section, we will describe a typical workflow for testing a new technol-
ogy within the local test bed. A third party who is interested in utilizing our
test bed will come to us to present their problem. From there, we will dis-
cuss with them what they require, what we can provide, and how to ensure
the largest overlap between the two. A test plan will be written, detailing
the procedure required to implement and test the new technology within the
VPST framework. Preferably, desirable outcomes will also be discussed and
agreed upon before testing commencing. A sample workflow beginning with
the power flow model creation is as follows.
8.1 Designing the Power Grid Layout
The first step in the process is to design a power network that exhbitits
traits that might be interesting. Someone who is knowledgable of a typical
power grid network will design this, as their knowledge should translate into
a realistic representation. One such power network can be seen in Figure 8.1.
This figure shows a power transmission network system for a large city, as
displayed by PowerWorld. PowerWorld itself offers many tools for designing,
interacting, and assessing power flow models. For the purpose of VPST,
the important features that it offers are the abilities to manually create and
export a design as well as support a real-time simulation. In order to interact
with the real-time simulation, a tool has been created to serve the current
snapshot’s power to client applications. This feature is not available in the
commercial release of PowerWorld at the time of this writing.
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8.2 Setting up the Lab
From the PowerWorld simulation, key information will be extracted. Typi-
cally, these are the IDs of lines, buses, generators, shunts, and loads. From
here, we generate the DML, set up proxies, and the EMS configuration. The
corresponding RINSE model is shown in Figure 8.2. From the PowerWorld
view, 36 buses and 196 distinct connections were found. These distinct con-
nections have been categorized into lines, loads, generators, and shunts and
are then represented by relays in the DML. As can be seen in the zoomed-in
box in Figure 8.2, the relays are then annotated to provide a reference point
in the PowerWorld model. Likewise, the corresponding EMS configuration
in Figure 8.3 shows a list of RTUs (i.e., data aggregators) that the EMS is
aware of and is able to poll for data. Currently, configuring the EMS is done
by hand, but work is being done to automate this process as well.
This portion of the workflow is set up to be as automatic as possible.
There are scripts to extract the information from PowerWorld, to create the
DML model and its corresponding routing information, to log in the proxy
machines and set up the redirects, and we are currently developing a script
to produce the control station configuration file. Once this portion of the
project is complete, it may even be possible to reproduce the entire lab setup
in another location, provided similar resources exist there as well.
8.3 Integrate New Technology
In order to integrate a new technology into the framework, there exist two
options. The first option is to provide a standalone device or model that can
be accessed through a network device. By doing this, the actual technology
is tested, as opposed to a recreation. The way in which this is done is similar
to how the State Server receives its values from PowerWorld (see Section
5.3). There would exist a virtual proxy of the device inside RINSE and a
physical proxy outside of RINSE. Traffic directed to the virtual proxy will
be forwarded, through emulation, to the physical proxy. From there, traffic
is redirected to a device hosting the new technology. Responses follow a
similar route through the physical proxy, through the virtual proxy, and to
the target host inside the simulator.
35
The other option is to incorporate a model of the technology directly into
RINSE. When using this option, the technology owner will need to work with
a point of contact in the RINSE development team in order to develop an
accurate model of their technology, whether that is a protocol or a bump-in-
the-wire device or anything else. RINSE is written in C++ and as such can
accept a C++ implementation of the new technology. The original imple-
mentation must be ported to C++, allowing some modifications to provide
networking support inside RINSE. Further work is planned to make RINSE
as modular as possible, to ease extensibility for cases such as this.
There are trade-offs to consider here, which must be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. For instance, in the C++ implementation case, there are issues
of fidelity and time of development. It takes time to develop a model and
ensure that it corresponds to the actual technology. There are also issues
of ensuring that the C++ model is in lock-step with the current iteration
of the product. In the emulation case, there may be issues of scalability,
latency, and availability of measurement data. If time allows, implementing
the technology directly inside of RINSE will usually allow for better results,
as the full benefit of scalable simulation can be realized.
8.4 Run Experiment and Draw Conclusions
Once all of the connections are set up and the entire communication flow is
shown to be working, it is time to test the technology in in silico. During
the course of the experiment, it is possible to interact with the model and
test how it reacts to certain commands. For instance, the EMS software
can provide a place for an operator to sit and monitor the grid. Depending
on the new technology, it may become easier or harder for the operator to
understand what is happening in the system. For instance, new technology
implemented in RINSE may simplify the operator’s job so that fewer errors
occur. On the other hand, it may accidentally drop communication under
certain conditions. Likewise, PowerWorld can offer information about the
performance of a new technology. For instance, if a command sent from
the EMS never produces a change in PowerWorld, this can be seen quickly
in PowerWorld and root-caused in RINSE. Once the experiment has run
its course, it is time to examine the results. Either they will match what
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was expected, and it is time to move on to the next stage, or they will
not match, and it is time to figure out why they do not match. Finally,
RINSE itself can provide valuable information. RINSE tracks metrics such as
bandwidth usage and dropped packets, and can be used to determine average
latency for communications. RINSE also provides debugging functionality
through detailed logging and tcpdump files that can be used to do post-
mortem evaluation of an experiment.
From these results, we can draw conclusions as to whether the new tech-
nology positively or negatively affects the communication network. After
understanding the implications of the current version, the researcher may
enhance the design and begin the cycle again. The hope is that this cy-
cle has a quicker turn-around than testing the software in isolation or going
through the hardware development process. This can be realized through
some important facets of RINSE – namely, network creation at run-time,
easily configurable network topologies, and immediate feedback. By chang-
ing parameters such as background traffic, link bandwidths, link latencies,
and topologies, RINSE provides a way to test a technology in a diverse set
of configurable environments.
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8.5 Figures
Figure 8.1: PowerWorld Sample Design
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Figure 8.2: Corresponding RINSE View
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Figure 8.3: Corresponding EMS View
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CHAPTER 9
VPST EXTENSION
From here on, the thesis will describe extensions to VPST that provide the
functionality required to integrate VPST with remote test beds. First, we
will discuss potential use cases that motivate this interconnection.
9.1 Use Cases
9.1.1 Training and Human-in-the-loop Event Analysis
Early detection and prevention technologies are required, as was learned from
the massive mid-western blackout in August 2003 [4], occurring largely be-
cause diverse failures caused a lack of situational awareness on the part of
the operators. Had there been different detection mechanisms in place, the
evolving disaster might have been recognized sooner, and corrected. Electri-
cal system data is continuously read and stored which allows system state
to be replayed on the testbed, presenting operators with the same data as
existed at the time of the blackout (or some other notable event). However,
the testbed can provide real or simulated versions of new technology. This
allows operators to react to what they now see (owing to the simulation),
which may be different from the original incident. As different control deci-
sions are made (e.g. open a breaker ) the testbed shifts from playing back
observed state information from the original event to generating a new state
trajectory, based on the new control decisions. By integrating with real de-
vice/emulation testbeds, VPST has two significant benefits over a traditional
power system training simulator: (1) actual hardware is in the loop, (2) the
communications system is modeled, allowing a more faithful interaction.
This use case requires the testbed to ensure the following: secure con-
nectivity for protecting sensitive information such as strategic decisions; re-
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producibility for event replay and analysis; scalability for large-scale power
grid experiments; and flexibility and fidelity for easy construction of realistic
scenarios from the operators’ point of view.
9.1.2 Analysis of Incremental Deployment
Securing the power grid requires an overhaul of the existing infrastructure.
However, the size and scope of the grid necessitates that the change be grad-
ual, not instantaneous. When old and new technologies coexist, there is
the possibility that unforeseen interactions may occur. For instance, current
communications make heavy use of the DNP3 protocol [25], yet this protocol
provides little in the way of security. Effort has been put into creating an
extension to DNP3—DNP3 Secure Authentication (DNP3SA)[17] that ad-
dresses authentication concerns with DNP3. As this is deployed, the legacy
support must be maintained. DNP3SA is just one example of many. We may
also want to analyze strategies for incremental deployment of new technolo-
gies, tested against a multitude of network conditions (e.g. lossy networks,
congested networks, insecure environments, while under attack, or with the
inclusion of corrupted data packets) and collect related statistics (e.g. band-
width usage, latency, dropped packets, success ratio for communications,
overhead incurred, etc.).
When testing a new protocol, device, or policy, there are a few important
requirements: reproducibility to ensure that any changes are a direct result of
the new technology in question; high performance in that we must accurately
model the scale of the real power grid; customizability in order to provide a
quick turnover from one configuration to another; and high fidelity in order
to guarantee that a new technology behaves the same in simulation as in the
real world.
9.1.3 Attack Robustness Analysis
A third use case is analyzing the robustness of a design against an attack.
For instance, the DETER testbed has a highly provisioned communications
network that is often used to test new protocols against well-defined attack
models. Also, Idaho National Labs (INL) has SCADA equipment for use in
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experiments. However, there is currently no safe way to launch an attack on a
large-scale SCADA network – VPST provides such an avenue for testing the
reliability of a SCADA network in the face of an attack. We can leverage the
cyber-attack capability of DETER, while integrating the real power equip-
ment that INL operates. VPST provides the crucial third testbed that can
simulate the SCADA network at full-scale with the added benefit of causing
no harm to the actual power grid.
The main requirements for such an experiment are: secure connectivity
to guarantee that attacks are contained to the network under duress; repro-
ducibility to allow repeated attacks against various defenses; and fidelity to
ensure the system under attack behaves reliably. Additionally, this use case
actualizes an attack, so it requires the ability to abstract attacks in order to
prevent WAN links from saturating (e.g., during a ping flood).
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CHAPTER 10
INTER-TESTBED CONNECTION
REQUIREMENTS
10.1 Secure Connectivity
Since the integrated testbed is targeted for SCADA network security anal-
ysis, security of the testbed itself is an absolute requirement. The testbed
may face threats from external cyber-attacks as well as internal malicious
code, which could intentionally or accidentally gain unauthorized access to
secret assets. A good security policy should enable several layers of protection
including transmission security, authentication and access control, traffic iso-
lation, intrusion detection, logging and reporting. However, existing security
technologies are generally not implemented in real SCADA systems because
real SCADA devices usually have limited processing capabilities, operate in
real time, and are typically not designed with cyber-security in mind.
To ensure a secure cross-testbed experimental environment, access control
policies and strong authentication should be enabled at all access points; the
access model should deny access to any party not explicitly allowed; and only
ports and services required for operations should be allowed. Open PCS Se-
curity Architecture for Interoperable Design (OPSAID)[40] is a framework for
accelerating development and adoption of a wide range of security function-
ality in control systems using IP networks. Its technical approach is to use
existing open-source technologies whenever possible. This approach could
be augmented with additional layers of protection to cover the full scope of
secure connectivity.
We have analyzed the current testbed situation and have implemented var-
ious measures to ensure the secure connectivity required by VPST. First, we
have segregated the virtual nodes onto a private network. This prohibits in-
cidental traffic emanating from our network and interfering with the outside
world unless specifically redirected to do so. Also, communication between
44
all components utilizes proven secure protocols. The local systems all com-
municate using OpenVPN (using SSL for encryption). The remote testbeds
connect using IPSec, which provides basic security guarantees.
10.2 Performance
For a testbed to be useful, it must provide timely results. In order for this
to occur, certain characteristics must hold true for both the inter-testbed
connections (ITC) as well as the performance of a single testbed. When
connecting two or more testbeds, precautions must be taken in order to
provide guarantees about performance, primarily concerning the latency of
information transfer between testbeds. To allow for efficient scaling, our
ITCs handle multiple connections by having a single point of contact and
then distributing the workload to other components. Instead of having an
individual connection for each emulated host, we aggregate the data and use
a tagging mechanism to differentiate between the hosts using “super nodes”
as discussed in Section 11.3.2.
Connecting with a simulated environment has its own set of issues, namely
the interaction between emulation and simulation. The communication sim-
ulator in VPST has the capability to absorb latency caused by emulated
packets. Since emulated packets take precedence over simulated packets, real
communication will always remain as close to real-time as possible. Look-
ahead is the ability to predict the amount of simulated time that could be
safely advanced in one process without causing errors in other concurrent
processes. Where possible, VPST-C utilizes look-ahead algorithms in order
to keep the simulation running as smoothly as possible.
The other source of latency is in the simulation control plane. The main
source of information provided over this link ought to be known ahead of
time and therefore can be transmitted prior to the start of simulation. By
shifting the bulk of control messages outside the simulation itself, we can
minimize the overhead incurred by control messages.
Another performance concern is that of scalability. One of VPST’s con-
tributions to the SCADA testbed community is that we provide a highly
scalable network simulator. Therefore, we must ensure that the scale of net-
works we can simulate is sufficient to justify the interconnection of other
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testbeds with VPST. VPST is capable of simulating over a million devices
and the electrical simulation can handle more than one hundred thousand
buses [41]. The size of a power grid that can be simulated with this much
capacity may be appreciated by comparison: a city the size of Madison, WI
(about a quarter of a million people) has a grid with a couple hundred buses.
In order to simulate a network of this scope in real-time, we make use of the
the Trusted ILLIAC [42] as discussed in Section 11.2.
10.3 Resource Allocation
Flexible configuration has been addressed for standalone simulation/emulation
testbeds in [19] and [43]. Further, an integrated testbed requires an accurate
resource mapping among testbeds for balancing customizability and speed.
VPST takes the decentralized approach, where interfaces to other testbeds
are decomposed into modules for the ease of customization. Details are dis-
cussed in Section 11.3.
VPST intelligently partitions simulation models for balancing resources
and minimizing communication overhead across multiple machines. Simi-
larly, a good mapping may minimize the number of links across heterogeneous
testbeds, though it is often hard to determine if a mapping is overloaded at
the initial stage of an experiment, especially when human decisions are later
involved. Therefore, techniques for overloaded link detection and dynamic re-
source mapping optimization are desired. Successive mappings are adjusted
based on the feedback from the detection system and the prior mapping,
until no overload is detected, or until all physical resources are depleted.
10.4 Reproducibility
The dynamics of the real SCADA network cover a wide range of conditions
including, but not limited to, the size of the network, type of underlying phys-
ical medium, available bandwidth and time-varying traffic patterns. There-
fore, precisely repeating the experimental conditions and reproducing entire
or partial results is a property of a good testbed. Integrating with a sim-
ulation testbed enhances reproducibility, since the entire parameter space
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including both input and environment configuration can be fully controlled.
Reproducibility in the scope of inter-connected testbeds requires conduct-
ing experiments in a controlled and interactive manner, especially allowing
human-in-the-loop decision, as discussed in Section 9.1.1. Experimenters are
given the opportunity to tune certain model parameters online, such as link
connectivity and event response mechanisms. VPST then progresses along
a new experimental trajectory, which is recorded as tcpdump/libpcap traces
for analysis and later reproduction.
Lastly, the testbed must be able to handle the unpredictability of long-
distance communication. For instance, if VSPT receives traffic with remote
origination, the simulation must be identical from one run to the next, re-
gardless of inter-site latency. VSPT utilizes algorithms that deal with this on
a local level, but it also must be addressed in the context of inter-operating
testbeds.
10.5 Fidelity
To provide high fidelity, VPST-C must be as transparent as possible. That is,
real-world equipment should not be able to tell that it is communicating with
a virtual host. In order to present this appearance to a real control station,
for instance, issues such as latency, realistic data patterns, and accurate
virtual hosts are all important aspects of VPST. Latency has been discussed
in Section 10.2, but realistic data and accurate hosts both fall under the
auspice of fidelity requirements.
Realistic data patterns are created through the interactions of each of the
layers modeled in VPST-C. Virtual hosts are responsible for creation of such
data. These virtual hosts can be as abstract as a “router” with a simple MAC
layer or as detailed as an “SEL 421 Relay” with a complete DNP3/MODBUS
stack and high resolution Ethernet.
Fidelity is often a counterpoint to performance in that the more accurately
a host is modeled, the more computation is required. As such, the trade-off
needs to be considered individually for each project that requires interaction
with VPST.
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CHAPTER 11
VPST ARCHITECTURE
11.1 Base System Overview
As introduced in [2], VPST is divided into three main subsystems. Figure
11.2 shows the following subsystems and their interconnections:
VPST-E handles electrical simulation. The primary component here is Pow-
erWorld which is capable of simulating large scale electrical networks at the
bus level. We use this to model city-sized or larger power grids. Using a
conversion module, PowerWorld can supply real-time input to our physical
devices in VPST-R-local. Using the same conversion tool, emulation and the
State Server in RINSE, we can provide data to VPST-C.
VPST-C handles network simulation based on RINSE [43], which provides a
highly scalable virtual network that is used to model the cyber domain of the
electrical grid. As discussed in previous sections, we have developed virtual
SCADA-specific models which are able to communicate among themselves
and real devices using DNP3 through emulation support. VPST-C can also
interact with VPST-R-local through emulation, supplying a realistic SCADA
environment to trusted third parties.
VPST-R-local represents all the real devices. Any software that is run
rather than simulated resides on some real device in the VPST-R-local, and
is represented inside of VPST-C by a device proxy. Devices in VPST-R-local
are capable of interacting with VPST-E through a converter, and VPST-C
through its emulation capability.
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11.2 Enhanced VPST
As seen in Figure 11.2, VPST-R-remote represents a remote test bed com-
municating with VPST through an ITC installed at the remote site. We have
enhanced VPST with the following significant augmentations:
ITC: In order to connect with a remote testbed, we extend the basic VPST
architecture by use of ITCs, discussed further in 11.3. Figures 11.2 and 11.3
both show one remote testbed, but this can be scaled to handle more than
one remote connection. The ITC is responsible for ensuring that two testbeds
are able to efficiently and expressively communicate with each other so as to
facilitate their interaction.
Trusted ILLIAC: Another enhancement to the VPST architecture we have
introduced is the use of high performance computing clusters, such as the
Trusted ILLIAC [42] and its 512 cores, to scale even further. VPST supports
model partitioning to intelligently spread virtual nodes across the allocated
processors so as to minimize inter-processor communication. This allows an
almost-linear scaling of performance per core. The Local Controller is re-
sponsible for interpreting configuration files in order to partition the graph
and allocate the Trusted ILLIAC resources.
Trace Files: We have also modified VPST to work with trace files. VPST
now has the capability of dumping the traffic into a tcpdump file that can be
replayed at a later time. First, this allows an external entity (e.g. a power
company) to use our testbed to examine their network traces for whatever
purpose they may have (e.g. testing a prevention policy). Secondly, this
allows replaying experiments in order to examine how real-world equipment
interacts under different configurations.
11.3 Inter-Testbed Connector Framework
Figure 11.3 shows the ITC architecture. The control plane and the data plane
are separated because the control channel is often more sensitive to latency
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and also requires less bandwidth than the data channel. In addition, control
signals likely require higher security level than traffic data does. When two
testbeds are initially connecting to each other, the ITC in VPST-C is always
identified as the master controller, which is responsible for making a high-
level resource allocation plan based on the requests initiated from slave ITCs
in other testbeds. Only the local ITC is allowed to communicate with the
local controller so as not to violate the local security policy. The architecture
design is decomposed into individual modules to allow customization and
facilitate the extension of functionality.
11.3.1 Simulation Control Plane
ITC Controller, the hub of an ITC, exchanges control commands with a
remote ITC and collects/distributes these control commands with the local
control plane. Secure connectivity is ensured here through access control
policies and authentication mechanisms.
Resource Allocator is responsible for managing resource allocation based
on requests from remote testbeds and responses from local resources. Load
balancing should be optimized here to improve performance and fidelity.
The Resource Allocator is also responsible for checking the correctness of the
topology mapping and detecting IP address conflicts across multiple testbeds.
Since VPST-C is the central component of the system and provides the in-
terconnection, IP uniqueness should be guaranteed by VPST-C. IP conflicts
in the simulator are automatically resolved through its IP reassignment pro-
cedure in the case of simulation, and the resource allocator performs IP
translation when real devices are used.
Resource Configurator is responsible for configuring network components
such as hosts, links and traffic. Using the Domain Modeling Language (DML)
in VPST-C makes the configuration process both flexible and reproducible.
DML is a simple scripting language with a hierarchical attribute tree nota-
tion. Each node is syntactically nested with all its attributes and its child
nodes to ease configuration for large-scale network experiments and, by ac-
curately modeling the network stack, to support high-fidelity distributed ex-
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perimentation.
Run-time Controller is responsible for controlling live experiments. This
could include tasks like starting a DoS attack or altering the data polling
pattern based on observed states at the remote site. However, overuse of
dynamic adjustment may increase communication overhead, lowering perfor-
mance. Therefore, a good practice may be to shift the majority of cross-
testbed communication to initialization and cleanup stages.
Error Detector is responsible for detecting abnormalities that occur dur-
ing a live experiment. These could include errors such as host failure, loss
of synchronization, or known warnings due to certain experimental param-
eters/intermediate outputs exceeding a preset threshold. To ensure fidelity,
the system will then take corresponding actions such as relocating extra
hosts, generating local or cross-testbed alerts, writing events to local system
logs, or terminating/restarting experiments. The error detector can either
be triggered by an abnormal event or perform periodic checks to ensure a
healthy experimental environment.
Data Plane Configurator is responsible for issuing controls to the data
plane at the initialization, run-time and cleanup stages of an experiment.
Controls include setting the distribution of incoming traffic, how to aggre-
gate outgoing traffic, and specifying the types of reports to collect upon
completion of an experiment.
11.3.2 Model Data Plane
Traffic Distributor is responsible for bridging traffic data across two testbeds
based on the settings from the data plane configurator. The number of cross-
testbed physical links are minimized for performance gain. Therefore, traffic
data is often aggregated and the traffic distributor is used to forward traf-
fic to the right destination. VPST-C has one type of node called a “super
node”, which handles real traffic from the emulation channel. It appends a
new virtual IP header based on an IP translation table established at the
initialization stage by the resource allocator, and then distributes packets as
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if the super node is a traffic generator. Upon leaving VPST-C, the virtual
IP header is extracted so that a remote real testbed can correctly handle the
packet.
Measurement Reporter is responsible for collecting statistics of the ex-
periment ranging from a single value like average packet loss rate to detailed
per-host status reports. Upon completion of an experiment, reports are sent
to the remote testbeds as instructed by the control plane. This module is
included in the data plane because in some cases, remote experimenters may
need the entire trace files, which require large bandwidth. Meanwhile, the
security level of the data channel must be raised accordingly if the reports
contain sensitive data.
11.4 Figures
Figure 11.1: Trusted ILLIAC
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CHAPTER 12
RELATED WORK
The following are SCADA testbeds that we are aware of. SCADA research
is incredibly important as the actions taken by and against the system can
affect the lives of millions. It is always a good a idea to have many eyes
looking over the same specifications and implementations to ensure that re-
quirements are met regarding safety, security, and reliable energy. That being
said, we feel that VPST fills a special need that other test beds do not.
DETER [19] is an Emulab-based security testbed with a shared infrastruc-
ture of several hundred experimental nodes. Many attacking/malware models
and tools for traffic/topology generation and analysis are available through
DETER. These resources must be leveraged in order to faithfully test the
security of SCADA networks. DETER also supports remote access while
providing assurance for isolation and containment of each experiment. How-
ever, everything in DETER is real, from the operating system to the network
stack, which makes replicating a full-scale SCADA network infeasible.
National SCADA Test Bed Program (NSTB) [44] was jointly estab-
lished at INL and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). NSTB consists of 61
miles of cables, 7 outstations, and more than 300 monitoring points across
the nation. Many equipment manufacturers and government agencies con-
duct tests on NSTB for finding tangible solutions to growing threats to the
power grid. However, NSTB is not publicly available. Even if it were, it is
still insufficient to explore the impact of various security technologies on a
nationwide power grid. In addition, it lacks the flexibility to explore different
architectures, since it is primarily a physical system.
Virtual Control System Environment Project (VCSE) [45] in SNL
was designed to incorporate their existing tools, including simulated, emu-
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lated, and physical components to assess security vulnerabilities in SCADA
systems. The main difference from VPST is that its OPNET-based simula-
tion framework does not scale nearly as well as RINSE.
The VIKING Project [46] is a project sponsored by the European Commu-
nitys Seventh Framework Program. Their research is similar to the work be-
ing done here, as they are concentrating on a combined simulation/emulation
framework with SCADA-specific models. However, their focus appears to be
on analzying attacks – specifically, denial of service, integrity, and phishing
attacks [47] and not appraising new technologies. Their use of Simulink by
MathWorks [48] provides a much higher degree of fidelity, going so far as
to simulate OS effects. This will, of course, provide greater fidelity, but it
will not sufficiently scale to investigate networks that approach the size of an
actual power control network.
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CHAPTER 13
CONCLUDING REMARKS
13.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have discussed the development of virtual models for DNP3,
data aggregators, and relays within the RINSE framework. These models are
important as they provide a realistic environment in which experimentation
on emerging power technologies can take place. The highly touted smart
grid and its related technology are being integrated into the existing grid at
an alarming rate. We must understand how they affect existing technologies
and our existing infrastructure. By utilizing the models discussed above, we
provide such an environment to test these technologies. In order to provide a
realistic simulation, the virtual relays acquire data from PowerWorld, a power
flow simulator, through a virtual host termed the State Server. This State
Server captures snapshots of the electrical simulation and provides them to
the virtual relays through shared memory. By enabling real time information
to be passed through our SCADA simulation, RINSE provides a platform for
testing new technologies in a scalable, high-fidelity manner. In Chapter 8, we
go through a sample workflow where we can see the steps required to verify
the functionality of a new technology.
In the second portion of the thesis, we have also shown that there is po-
tential in connecting VPST with remote testbeds, in order to take advantage
of their unique offerings. We have discussed many of the concerns regarding
integrating multiple testbeds as well as the methods that we employ to al-
leviate said concerns. We have also presented other testbeds and concluded
that VPST fills an important niche that other testbeds cannot.
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13.2 Future Work
One area that needs to be looked into is report-by-exception polling. This
can come in two flavors. The first is a polled report-by-exception which is a
poll that only asks for data which has changed. This should be fairly easy
to implement. Another form is unsolicited report-by-exception. This allows
a relay to send a message if something has changed state, without being
asked to do so. This type of reporting is also currently unimplemented, but
would require greater effort, due to the nature in which the state server is
implemented. Without having access to the actual grid, but relying on the
advice of experts, it seems as though relays support report-by-exception, but
often do not use it as resources may be better spent on real-time monitoring.
In any case, this seems like a natural feature to implement.
A nontrivial amount of work had been put into formally verifying a pre-
cursor to the architecture described in Figure 6.1 using the Symbolic Model
Verifier (SMV) [49]. However, it was put aside in order to focus development
on the model itself. More work must be done to verify the framework, and
formal verification could provide a useful and interesting way to do that.
The DNP Users Group has published test procedures for Levels 1 and
2, the simplest implementations. Future work ought to be done to ensure
that the virtual models developed in RINSE pass these tests, or at least
that sub-portions of these tests are deemed relevant to the demands of the
experiment. It may be wise to introduce models that conform to varying
levels of these tests, so as to provide certain guarantees regarding both fidelity
and performance.
One area of concern mentioned by people who reviewed this work is that
of clock skew among the relays. As implemented, the state server receives
values in chunks. All data within a given chunk has occured during the
same time slice. However, in the real grid, data from separate relays are
never guanranteed to occur during the same time slice. This is the type of
problem that synchrophasor techonology [50] is attempting to fix. However,
the question of how, or even whether, to simulate this effect will require
some examination. Again, this raises the question regarding fidelity versus
performance again. In order to simulate this clock skew, the state server must
query each data point separately and provide randomization in the timing as
well. This overhead may impact the performance of the simulation, as well
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as the freshness of the data.
One of the next steps we would like to take is to develop a black-box
implementation of the current ITC. This box would be installed in a remote
testbed and would be responsible for seamlessly connecting a remote testbed
to ours with as little manual configuration as possible. In addition to this,
we believe there is benefit in extracting as much efficiency out of the WAN
transmissions as possible (e.g., compression of data and intelligent use of
control messages to reduce the amount of traffic that must pass over the
link). For instance, a real flooding attack would not be tolerated over a
WAN link since this will likely be the bottleneck.
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